Showing posts with label post-quantum cryptography. Show all posts
Showing posts with label post-quantum cryptography. Show all posts

Thursday, September 24, 2026

DOE Puts $215 Million on 100 Logical Qubits

My quarterly-updated book, Quantum from the Ground Up, tracks the hardware race toward fault-tolerant quantum computers. The Department of Energy just put a date on it. On September 17, DOE launched the Quantum Genesis Q Competition with up to $215 million planned. Teams must deploy at least 100 logical qubits running hundreds of millions of fault-tolerant operations on chemistry, materials, physics, and applied mathematics problems. The evaluation is set for September 2028.

I've written prior - a logical qubit combines many physical qubits under error correction so the result survives a long calculation. Chapter 4 of the book walks through how that works. Some chips already carry more than 1,000 physical qubits, and those qubits still make too many errors to finish useful work. Here's the DOE competition breakdown.

Phase I awards up to $1.5 million per team for early milestones. Phase II holds $100 million for teams that reach 100 logical qubits, plus two $50 million bonus pools at 150 and 200. HPCwire reports that each pool splits equally among the teams that qualify, so a team at 200 logical qubits draws from all three.

       Structure of the DOE Quantum Genesis Q Competition. Source: U.S. DOE, HPCwire

Verification sits with the national labs. DOE plans a $45 million testbed to benchmark competitors' claims independently. Vendors submit results, and the labs check them before any pool pays out.

QuEra and Harvard have shown 96 logical qubits on neutral atoms, the figure cited in Chapter 8, so at least one platform sits near the count. The operation depth and outside verification set the higher bar. Microsoft's Majorana roadmap, covered in Chapter 10, targets 2029, a year after DOE's evaluation.

Two caveats. Only $2.5 million of the $215 million comes from FY2026 funds, and Congress controls the rest. And 100 logical qubits sits far below the roughly 1 million physical qubits Gidney estimated in 2025 for breaking RSA-2048, the baseline in Chapter 13. A 100-logical-qubit machine cannot break RSA-2048, so the schedule for moving to post-quantum encryption stays the same.

Applications close October 19. DOE holds an applicant webinar September 25 at 1:00 p.m. ET. This post goes into the next edition (December 2026) of Quantum from the Ground Up, available here.

Tuesday, September 8, 2026

Quantum from the Ground Up: Second Edition, September 2026

A free PDF pulling together posts from this blog into a single volume. Written for someone entering the quantum workforce, or seriously considering it, who has a technical background but has not taken a graduate course in quantum mechanics.

This edition folds in 22 posts published between June 3 and August 26 into the same 19 chapters as the first edition: quantum networking over existing fiber, the physics-versus-engineering distinction, six qubit fabrication platforms, protein simulation and AI-assisted hardware calibration, post-quantum cryptography, the hardware landscape as it stands in late summer 2026, and the quantum workforce.

Download PDF: Second Edition, September 2026

Edition

Second edition, September 2026

Pages

73

Chapters

19

Source posts

39 posts, October 2025 to August 2026

Updates

Quarterly

License

CC BY-NC-ND 4.0: free to share with attribution, no commercial use, no modifications

 

What's new in this edition

●      Quantum memory repeaters tested on a live network by IonQ and EPB in Chattanooga

●      A free-space quantum network link built by Brookhaven and Stony Brook

●      Two linked quantum cryostats from IBM, a step toward fault-tolerant systems

●      A sputtering-gas fix for a superconducting qubit manufacturing defect, from Cornell

●      A universal gate set on 28 qubits using code-switching magic states, from Quantinuum

●      Two June 22 executive orders: new post-quantum cryptography migration deadlines and the QC-ADDS program

●      IonQ's acquisition of its own chip foundry

●      Quantum key distribution deployed on production Cisco routers

●      IBM's free Quantum Learning certification path

Updates

This page will always link to the current edition. Updates are planned quarterly as new posts on quantum hardware, security, and workforce development are published on this blog. The next edition covers Q3 2026, due around December 1.

Support this work

The book is free and will stay free. If you find it useful and want to support future editions, contributions are welcome at ko-fi.com/gordostuff.

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

Post-Quantum Crypto Just Got a Chip to Run On

Chapter 14 of Quantum from the Ground Up covers the hardware side of post-quantum cryptography, meaning new encryption methods designed to survive an attack from a future quantum computer. This week gave that a concrete data point. BTQ Technologies and Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute validated the first phase of a chip architecture built specifically to run the new encryption standards in hardware instead of software.

Why Hardware Matters Here

Encryption, whether old or new, is math. A processor runs that math the same way it runs any other program: by fetching instructions and data from memory, doing the calculation, then writing the result back. Post-quantum encryption methods use larger keys and more complex math than the encryption in use today, so they demand more of that fetch-and-calculate cycle. Running them purely in software, on a general-purpose processor, is slower and draws more power. That is a real problem for a car's onboard computer, a factory sensor, or a battery-powered IoT device that cannot spare the extra milliseconds or milliwatts.

The fix is to build a dedicated piece of hardware that runs only the encryption math, wired directly for that job. That is what a chip architecture like QCIM is.

What QCIM Actually Does

QCIM stands for Quantum Compute-in-Memory. Despite the name, it does not involve quantum computing itself. It refers to where the calculation happens on the chip. In a standard chip layout, memory and the processor are separate blocks connected by a data bus, and every calculation means shuttling data back and forth across that bus. Compute-in-memory design instead performs the calculation inside or immediately next to the memory itself, cutting out most of that back-and-forth. Less movement means lower power draw and faster results, which is exactly what power-constrained devices need if they are going to run demanding post-quantum math.

BTQ built this particular version around three specific encryption standards published by NIST: FIPS 203, 204, and 205. These are the official post-quantum algorithms the US government has approved for general use, covering both encrypting data and verifying digital signatures. Any hardware built to accelerate post-quantum cryptography needs to run these three algorithms specifically, since they are what systems will actually be required to support going forward.

 

What Was Tested, and What It Showed

The test ran inside a TSMC 28-nanometer design environment. TSMC is the world's largest chip manufacturer, and 28-nanometer refers to the size of the transistors in the manufacturing process being simulated, an older and well-proven node rather than the cutting edge, which keeps early testing cheaper and more predictable. Inside that environment, researchers checked two things. First, whether the QCIM core could genuinely speed up FIPS 203, 204, and 205 operations. Second, whether it produced correct results while doing so, since a faster chip that gets the math wrong is worthless for security. Both held up under the demanding conditions BTQ and ITRI put it through. ITRI's Dr. Chih-Cheng Lu called it meaningful progress toward module-level integration, the next phase of the program, where the core gets built into a larger working system rather than tested on its own.

BTQ is not new to this work. The collaboration with ITRI traces back to 2022, and a companion program with South Korea's ICTK is aimed at a fully integrated, commercially deployable chipset built around the same core. BTQ has said it expects to ship QCIM test chips to customers and partners by the end of the year. The target applications read like a list of things you do not want to re-secure one device at a time later: military systems, industrial equipment, automotive platforms, IoT devices, and connected infrastructure generally, all of which stay in service for years and are hard to patch remotely.

What This Changes in the Book

Chapter 14 already covers hardware paths to PQC, citing the SEALSQ QS7001. QCIM adds a second, independently developed example aimed at the same FIPS standards, this time using compute-in-memory design. The next edition adds it alongside QS7001 and tracks the module-level integration phase BTQ and ITRI are moving into next.

QCIM is the third hardware entry in a pattern this blog has been tracking since December: SEALSQ's QS7001, covered in The Quantum Security Race: Software vs. Hardware, and STMicroelectronics' ST54M, covered in Government Sets New Deadline for Quantum-Safe Encryption. All three chips target the same FIPS 203/204/205 standards introduced in Quantum Computers Just Got Much Closer to Breaking Your Passwords, and all three exist because the federal migration deadlines covered in that June post do not leave software-only implementations enough runway.

This post will fold into the next edition of Quantum from the Ground Up, due September 1.

Tuesday, July 21, 2026

Why Quantum Computing Matters, Even If You Never Touch One

I logged into my bank app last week to move some money to pay some bills. A padlock icon appeared next to the address bar. Secure connection. I didn't think about it again. Somewhere, someone already has a copy of that session, sitting on a hard drive, waiting.

That padlock runs on a math problem: factor a huge number into its two prime components. A classical computer needs longer than the age of the universe to do that. A large enough quantum computer, running an algorithm built for exactly this job, does it in hours. That computer does not exist yet. It is being built right now, funded by billions of dollars, and no government or company controlling that funding will announce the day it works.

You do not get to wait for that announcement. Security researchers call the attack already underway harvest now, decrypt later. Think about what you have touched on the web this year: your bank, your medical portal, your voter registration, your immigration or legal filings, your tax return, your cloud photo backup. State-backed intelligence services and criminal groups are copying that same traffic from millions of other people today, and storing it cheaply. Almost none of it needs to be cracked now. It needs to still exist, on somebody's drive, the day a quantum computer catches up. Then all of it becomes readable at once.

NIST finalized three new encryption standards built to resist this and set 2035 as the deadline to retire the vulnerable ones. Cloudflare and Google are not waiting until then; they have committed to migrating by 2029. Banks, hospitals, and government agencies holding decades-long records are moving faster still, because for them the clock already ran out on some of what they are protecting.

The fix is not a patch on the old method. It replaces the math underneath it. Government researchers finalized a new set of encryption methods built to survive a quantum computer, the same way today's methods survive an ordinary one. Companies are not waiting to switch over all at once, either. Cloudflare, Google, and Apple already run two locks on the same connection at the same time: the old one and the new one. If someone finds a weakness in the new lock, the old one still holds. If a quantum computer breaks the old lock, the new one still holds. Traffic protected this way stops being worth harvesting, because breaking one lock alone gets an attacker nothing.

Getting every bank, hospital, and government agency onto the new locks is the slow part. It means finding every place the old encryption sits inside a system and replacing it without breaking what depends on it. The federal government has published a shared plan for doing exactly that, across every agency and industry. None of it requires anything from you. It happens inside the apps and websites you already use.

The fix only protects what gets encrypted after it is installed, though. Anything copied under the old lock before that happens is already sitting on somebody's drive, and nothing reverses that. New encryption prevents future harvesting. It does not undo what has already been taken.

Diagram claude.ai generated

Nothing solves the data that is already sitting on somebody's drive. There is no way to reach into another party's storage, revoke a copy, or make it unreadable again. The new locks protect what gets encrypted after they are installed. They have no effect on a copy that left your device years earlier.

How much that matters depends on what kind of data it is. A password can be changed after the fact, so a stolen password loses most of its value once you reset it. A medical record, a Social Security number, or a biometric scan cannot be changed. Whatever gets exposed on that front stays exposed for good. It also depends on how long the data needed to stay private in the first place. Something that only mattered for a few years is probably already safe by the time a quantum computer shows up. Something that needed to stay private for decades, a government file, a company's trade secrets, a hospital's records, is running on a clock that started the day it was copied, not the day the quantum computer arrives.

Most people are not personally worth the effort. A patient attacker spends storage on high-value targets: government communications, corporate research, hospital systems, banks. If you end up exposed, it is more likely through one of those institutions holding your data than through anyone singling you out.

There is not much a consumer can do about data that is already gone. A few things still help:

•   Rotate what can be rotated. Change passwords regularly. A password manager makes it cheap enough to do more than once.

•   Turn on two-factor authentication. It stops a harvested password from being enough to log in on its own, since an attacker also needs your phone, an authenticator app, or a security key. It does not protect the data itself. A hospital record, a legal filing, or an old email that already left your device is untouched by it, because it only fires at login, not on the traffic that carries the data.

•   Not every two-factor method is equal. A text message code can be intercepted or rerouted if someone tricks your phone carrier into moving your number to a new SIM. An authenticator app is safer, since the code generates on your phone instead of traveling over the phone network. A hardware security key is safer still, a small physical device that checks a site's real address before it responds, so it does not work on a convincing fake login page. Use one for your email, your bank, and your password manager itself.

•   Assume what cannot be rotated is already out. Watch for misuse instead of trying to prevent something that may have already happened. A credit freeze and fraud alerts catch someone using a stolen Social Security number long before you would otherwise notice.

•   Keep your software current. The new locks only work if your browser, phone, and apps are recent enough to use them. An old browser is still running the old lock alone.

•   Think twice about what you put online today. Anything sent through email, cloud storage, or a messaging app now can still be harvested under the old lock until your provider finishes switching over.

•   Ask the institutions holding your data. A bank or hospital's own migration timeline affects your exposure more than anything you do personally, and it is a fair question to put to them directly.

None of it undoes what has already been copied. It limits what is still worth harvesting and reduces the damage from what is not.

The padlock on my banking app will look exactly the same through all of this. Behind it, the locks are being swapped one at a time: bank by bank, cloud provider by cloud provider. The question left is not whether the new lock exists. It is how much of your data got copied before it arrived.

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Government Sets New Deadline for Quantum-Safe Encryption

A student in one of my summer courses asked the question I get every time encryption comes up in discussion: why does this matter now? RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) and ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) have protected data for decades. The quantum computer that breaks them does not exist yet. 

My usual answer leans on Q-Day estimates: Google's Gidney put the threshold at roughly one million physical qubits to break RSA-2048, and an IonQ fidelity result last October pushed the realistic window to somewhere between 2029 and 2033. Most expert estimates before that sat closer to 2035. On June 22, the federal government answered the student's question for me. President Trump signed 

an executive order setting hard deadlines for federal post-quantum cryptography migration (PQC): agencies must move high value assets to post-quantum key establishment by December 31, 2030, and post-quantum digital signatures by December 31, 2031. Federal contractors get the same 2030 deadline for FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards) compliance.

That replaces the prior government baseline. Under the Biden administration's National Security Memorandum 10, agencies were planning around 2035. The new order compresses that by four to five years and adds teeth: agencies must name a PQC migration lead within 30 days, the Commerce Department must run a migration pilot by the end of 2027, and contractors face FIPS enforcement through procurement rules. 

Coverage from Cybersecurity Dive notes the order also pushes CISA (the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) to publish guidance on cryptographic bills of materials, the inventory work agencies need before they can migrate anything.

How the Industry Responded

Two days after the signing, STMicroelectronics introduced the ST54M, the first mobile chip with a dedicated hardware accelerator for post-quantum algorithms. It runs ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) and ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm), the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) standards finalized in 2024, on a single die alongside NFC (near-field communication), secure element, and eSIM (embedded SIM) functions. Commercial sampling is available now, with certification targeted for July 2026. That is the hardware path the federal order is pushing the rest of industry toward on the same compressed timeline.

I tell students today: nobody knows the exact day a cryptographically relevant quantum computer arrives, but the government just stopped waiting to find out. And.... I would not be surprised at all to see the deadline moved forward again.... soon.

Wednesday, June 17, 2026

Authentication, Not Encryption, Is Now The Big Quantum Worry

In the chapter on the threat to encryption in Quantum from the Ground Up, I cited a 2025 estimate from Craig Gidney at Google Quantum AI that RSA-2048 could be factored by a quantum computer with roughly one million noisy physical qubits, and noted that most experts placed Q-Day, the point at which a quantum computer can break current encryption, at around 2035. That estimate did not survive the spring.

In late March and early April 2026, two independent research results arrived within weeks of each other. Google published a major improvement to the quantum algorithm used to break elliptic curve cryptography, the math behind most of the internet's key exchange. Then Oratomic, a quantum computing startup, published a resource estimate suggesting RSA-2048 and P-256 could be broken with as few as 10,000 qubits on a neutral atom machine. That is roughly two orders of magnitude below the prior million-qubit estimate.

Why 10,000 Qubits Instead of a Million

The efficiency gain comes from error correction overhead, not from a change in the underlying mathematics. Shor's algorithm, the quantum algorithm that breaks RSA and ECC, has not changed. What changed is how many physical qubits it takes to build one reliable logical qubit on a neutral atom platform. Reporting on the Oratomic estimate put the ratio at roughly three to four physical qubits per logical qubit, a dramatically smaller overhead than superconducting platforms have required.

That ratio matters because it is the number that determines whether an attack is a research curiosity or an engineering project with a budget and a timeline. A million-qubit machine is not something any organization is building in this decade. A 10,000-qubit machine is in the range that QuEra, Atom Computing, and Pasqal have all stated as roadmap targets for 2026 to 2028 in the neutral atom chapters of this book. The number did not just get smaller. It got small enough to be plausible on hardware roadmaps that already exist.

How the Industry Responded

Cloudflare's response is the clearest signal of how seriously the industry is taking this. Cloudflare secures a significant fraction of global internet traffic, and the company had already completed most of its post-quantum encryption rollout, protecting against harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks where adversaries collect encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once a quantum computer is available. That work was largely done. The Google and Oratomic results changed what Cloudflare is worried about next.

Cloudflare's senior product director told reporters that authentication, not data confidentiality, is now the bigger concern. The distinction is worth sitting with. If a quantum computer can forge access credentials, an attacker does not need to decrypt anything. They can log into systems they are not supposed to have access to, or compromise a software update channel directly. That is a more immediate and more damaging failure mode than data theft, and it requires a different and more complex migration than swapping out an encryption algorithm.

Cloudflare set 2029 as its target for full post-quantum security across its platform, including authentication, and has accelerated its existing roadmap to hit that date. Google made a similar 2029 commitment. Coverage of the shift described the timeline change as a direct response to the two breakthroughs, and one report quoted the view that a coordinated attack against a high-value target, what the article called a moonshot attack, could plausibly arrive by 2030.

What This Changes in the Book

Chapter 13 of the first edition gave a 2029 to 2033 range as the accelerated estimate, driven by IonQ's October 2025 fidelity result. That range still holds, but the reasoning behind it has shifted. The IonQ result was a hardware fidelity improvement on an existing approach. The Google and Oratomic results are an algorithmic and architectural efficiency gain that reduces the qubit count needed for the same outcome. Both push in the same direction, but they are different kinds of progress, and the second edition will need to explain both rather than treating the timeline as a single number that moves around.

The Oratomic estimate specifically relies on high-rate quantum error-correction codes to achieve its 3:1 physical-to-logical overhead ratio. It is worth emphasizing that we are talking about 10,000 physical qubits here. Because the cybersecurity industry has spent a decade hearing that breaking RSA requires millions of physical qubits, highlighting that this breakthrough brings the physical hardware requirements down to the low thousands underscores just how radical this architectural shift is. Furthermore, this timeline collapse wasn't driven by hardware breakthroughs alone; as noted in the landmark paper co-published by Caltech and Oratomic, the team heavily leveraged AI-assisted algorithmic design and reconfigurable arrays to optimize these error-correcting codes, proving that classical AI is actively accelerating the software running on quantum roadmaps. Meanwhile, Google Quantum AI's joint research demonstrated that the logical qubit threshold to break elliptic curve cryptography could be slashed by 20x, creating a compounding effect where hardware requirements dropped while algorithm efficiencies spiked.

The organizational guidance from Chapter 13 does not change, it gets more urgent. Inventory your cryptographic dependencies. Specify quantum-resistant encryption in procurement. Re-encrypt long-term sensitive data. Build crypto agility into your architecture so algorithms can be swapped without a system rebuild.

The new addition, following Cloudflare's formal roadmap acceleration announcement, is that authentication systems deserve the same attention as encrypted data. As industry infrastructure leaders begin locking down their platforms against these newly compressed timelines, a compromised root certificate or access token is recognized as a far more catastrophic failure than a decrypted file, and it is the exact vulnerability the industry is now scrambling to patch.

This post will be incorporated into the second edition of Quantum from the Ground Up, out September 1. The full book, updated quarterly, is free at gordostuff.com/p/quantum-from-ground-up-hardware.html

Thursday, June 11, 2026

Quantum from the Ground Up: First Edition Now Available


I have been learning and writing about quantum computing on
gordostuff.com since October 2025. The posts started as a way to make sense of announcements as they happened: IonQ hitting 99.99% two-qubit gate fidelity, Microsoft unveiling Majorana 2, IBM running a 12,635-atom protein simulation, Apple releasing a 50,000-step formal proof of its post-quantum cryptographic library. Each one went up as a standalone post. After eight months and seventeen posts, it made more sense to put them together in one place.

The result is Quantum from the Ground Up, a free PDF now available at gordostuff.com. This first edition covers posts through June 2026 and runs 50 pages across 19 chapters. It is written for someone entering the quantum workforce, or seriously considering it, who has a technical background but has not taken a graduate course in quantum mechanics.

Download: Download Link For All Editions

The book covers six qubit fabrication platforms in sequence: superconducting circuits, trapped ions, photonics, neutral atoms, silicon spin qubits, and topological qubits. Each chapter describes the physical mechanism, the fabrication or trapping method, current performance numbers, and the specific engineering problems that remain unsolved. The qubit chapters are followed by sections on hybrid classical-quantum protein simulation, AI-assisted hardware calibration, post-quantum cryptography, and the hardware landscape as it stands in mid-2026.

Two chapters address the workforce directly. The first maps the adjacent skill sets the quantum supply chain actually needs: semiconductor process engineering, cryogenic systems operation, RF electronics, machine learning for hardware calibration, and cryptographic implementation. None of those require a physics PhD. The second chapter maps the full degree pathway from a two-year associate degree through a PhD, with specific programs, what each credential prepares you to do, and salary ranges at each level. The field has a real workforce shortage. The shortage is not only at the PhD tier.

The plan is to update the book quarterly as new posts are published. The field moves fast enough that a quarterly cycle makes sense: slow enough to let any given announcement settle, fast enough to stay current with actual engineering progress. This edition covers October 2025 through June 2026. The next update will incorporate posts from Q3 2026.

Seventeen posts, fifty pages, fifteen images, one dark navy cover. The posts were worth writing individually. They are more useful together. Download all editions free at Download PDF.

Support This Work

The book is free and will stay free. If you find it useful and want to support future editions, send me an email at gordon@gordostuff.com

Wednesday, May 27, 2026

Apple’s Corecrypto Proof And A Next Phase Of Quantum Migration

In the late 1990s, a new kind of encryption called elliptic curve cryptography started showing up in phones, websites, and game consoles. The math behind it was solid. The code that ran the math was not. Engineers made small mistakes deep inside the software, and attackers found them. In 2010, Sony lost the master signing key for the PlayStation 3 because the code reused a random number it was supposed to generate fresh every time. Once that key leaked, anyone could load any software they wanted onto the console. The math worked. The code did not.

I wrote in April about the two paths to post-quantum cryptography, software and hardware, and how moving everything over will take more than a decade. Post-quantum cryptography, or PQC, is the new family of encryption designed to survive future quantum computers. Today’s encryption depends on math problems that classical computers cannot solve in any reasonable time. A large enough quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm makes those problems easy.

On May 22, Apple released a major update to corecrypto, the encryption software running on more than 2.5 billion Apple devices. The update includes the new post-quantum algorithms standardized by NIST, called ML-KEM (for key exchange) and ML-DSA (for digital signatures). What makes this release different is that Apple also published a mathematical proof that the code does exactly what the standard says it should do. No surprises. No hidden mistakes. The technique is called formal verification, and it has been used for decades in chip design and aerospace software. Seeing it applied to cryptography on consumer devices is new.

It often takes years of work and very specialized math skills. Apple’s proof runs more than 50,000 steps and already caught a bug that normal testing would have missed. Apple open-sourced the tools, including software built by Galois Inc., so other companies can do the same thing. iMessage, Signal, Chrome, and Cloudflare are already shipping post-quantum protections, and more are coming.

For decades the pattern was ship first, fix later. The quantum migration is too important and too complicated for that. Apple just showed what doing it right looks like. The next step for us academics - colleges and training programs must prepare engineers who will do it.